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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I introduce and compare & contrast well-known theories of justice. 
Then, I introduce realities of capital punishment practice in the United States using both 
descriptive empirical data and summaries of recent studies of the death penalty. Finally, I 
assess capital punishment in terms of ways in which it is consistent and inconsistent with 
the major theories of justice. The primary goal of the paper is to answer the question of 
whether capital punishment in the United States is just or not, and why. This is the first 
time these theories of justice have specifically been applied to capital punishment as it is 
currently practiced in the United States.  
 
Introduction 
  It is fair to say that capital punishment is under attack, particularly in the South 
where it is most commonly practiced. Not only have serious criticisms been raised by 
scholars in criminal justice, criminology and related disciplines (e.g., Robinson, 2009a), but 
newspapers have published scathing news reports suggesting that innocent people have 
been sentenced to death and even executed (e.g., Grann, 2009), and alleging racial 
discrimination in capital punishment practice (Burns, 2010). 
States are taking notice. As one clear example, the state of North Carolina not only 
became the first state to create an “Innocence Inquiry Commission”— a state-level agency 
established in August 2006 to investigate and evaluate post-conviction claims of factual 
innocence — but it also became only the second state in the nation to pass a “Racial Justice Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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Act” in August 2009. The latter law allows death-row inmates to challenge death sentences 
based on alleged racial biases (including through the use of statistical studies). Judges can 
overturn death sentences if prosecutors are unable to disprove that race played a 
meaningful role in the death penalty cases. Pre-trial defendants can also allege racial biases 
which can result in judges not allowing death sentences at trial (North Carolina General 
Assembly, 2009). These developments are especially significant since they have occurred in 
a state that has historically been among the leaders in the nation in terms of its death 
sentencing rate, size of death row, and number of executions per year (in 2011, the state 
House passed a repeal of the Racial Justice Act but the Senate did not take up the bill, 
although it pledges to consider the bill next term). 
Issues of innocence and race are but two of a handful of significant issues that are 
relevant to whether capital punishment practice is consistent with justice. There are many 
differing conceptions of justice, each of which suggests a different concept of greatest 
importance. In this paper, I introduce and compare & contrast well-known theories of 
justice. Then, I introduce the realities of capital punishment practice in the United States. 
Finally, I assess capital punishment in terms of ways in which it is consistent and 
inconsistent with the major theories of justice. The primary goal of the paper is to answer 
the question of whether capital punishment in the United States is just or not, and why. This 
is the first time these theories of justice have specifically been applied to capital punishment 
as it is currently practiced in the United States. 
Theories of Justice 
  Justice is typically defined as administering and maintaining what is just or right. 
According to a leading justice scholar, Michael Sandel (2009), there are three broad issues 
discussed and debated by scholars of justice theory—freedom, welfare, and virtue. Some 
justice theorists argue that what matters most for deciding what is right or just is freedom—
whether individual rights are respected and protected. These scholars are called libertarians 
because they say what matters most for justice is liberty. For some, this means protecting Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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civil liberties granted to citizens through the US Constitution (e.g., John Rawls, 1971). For 
others it means assuring the right of people to pursue, own, and control property with 
minimal governmental interference (e.g., Friedrich Hayek, 1960; Milton Friedman, 1962; 
Robert Nozick, 1974). The latter camp is often referred to as free market libertarians 
because most of their arguments are economic in nature. 
  Another school of thought is the egalitarian libertarians. These scholars suggest that 
what matters most for justice is equality of opportunity in society and taking care of the 
least advantaged citizens (e.g., David Miller, 2003). There is a basic disagreement between 
free market and egalitarian libertarians; the former end up arguing against government 
interference in property exchanges even in cases where capitalism produces massive 
inequities between the wealthy and the poor, whereas the latter often argue for government 
intervention to make arrangements in society fairer for all and especially for the poor and 
needy. 
  Other justice theorists focus on welfare, or general well-being and happiness of 
people in society. They argue that what matters most for justice is the welfare of society, or 
its overall happiness. For example, Jeremy Bentham‟s (1789) utilitarianism says that 
whether something is just depends on whether it maximizes utility or the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people. 
Finally, other justice theorists argue that what matters most for justice is virtue, or 
moral goodness and righteousness. For example, Aristotle‟s (1280) theory suggests that 
justice demands giving people what they deserve or what they are due. This means 
honoring and rewarding those values or virtues that are worthy of honor and reward. In 
order to make such determinations, we must first make decisions about what is good or 
righteous in the first place. There is a controversy between those, like Michael Sandel, who 
believe that justice theory cannot be silent on matters of virtue or the “good life” and those, 
like John Rawls, who always argued that it must be. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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Immanuel Kant‟s (1785) view is also relevant here. According to Kant, whether 
something is just or not depends only whether it is the right thing to do, regardless of the 
consequences. That is, whether something is just is determined by motive, or whether it is 
morally right. Something is morally right, according to Kant, if it respects the moral law 
which requires us to treat each other as autonomous beings worthy of respect. 
Although each approach is organized primarily around one major concept (i.e., 
freedom, welfare, or virtue), specific theorists have over time “borrowed” from the other 
schools of thought to build their own theories of justice. As such, there is significant overlap 
between these different theories of justice. For example, John Stuart Mill (a utilitarian) 
claimed that the best way to achieve maximum happiness in society is to respect people‟s 
liberties (like a libertarian) (Mill, 1869). Mill argued that individuals should be allowed to do 
whatever they want as long as they produce no harm to others. Another example is 
Friedman Hayek (a free market libertarian), who also wrote about the importance of 
enforcing equality in the law (like an egalitarian) (Hayek, 1960). Hayek noted that, although 
unequal outcomes in society are an inevitable result of competition in a free market system, 
everyone should still enjoy equal protection of the law so that they have equal opportunity 
to succeed. Another example is John Rawls (an egalitarian), who stressed the importance of 
“equal liberty” (like a libertarian). Rawls first principle of justice is that every citizen has the 
same basic rights, protected by the US Constitution (Rawls, 2003). Finally, David Miller (an 
egalitarian) presents a theory of justice containing three principles, one of which is desert 
(Miler, 2003). To Miller, in matters of “instrumental associations” such as work, justice 
requires that people get what they deserve (similar to the virtue based theory of Aristotle). 
Finally, the concept of social justice is important here. Social justice is a concept that 
is generally equated with individual rights and equality (Berry, 2005; Brighouse, 2005). As 
such it is most related to the libertarian and egalitarian theories of justice, two theories of 
justice Americans hold dear, as reflected in our Declaration of Independence and US 
Constitution and the due process of law these documents celebrate and establish (Martin, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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2010; Orth, 2007). Thus, the question of whether America‟s death penalty is consistent with 
libertarianism and egalitarianism should be an important question for Americans, and has 
great relevance for whether capital punishment is socially just. 
Which Theories of Justice are Relevant for Capital Punishment? 
  Each of the major theories outlined above—libertarianism, egalitarianism, 
utilitarianism, and virtue-based theory—is relevant for the practice of capital punishment in 
the United States. When it comes to the death penalty, the most important question for 
libertarians is whether it respects liberty or freedom. The most important question for 
egalitarians is whether capital punishment practice is equal (i.e., applied in an equal 
fashion). For utilitarians, the most important question is whether capital punishment 
increases overall utility or happiness in society. Finally, for virtue-based theorists, the 
question is whether capital punishment respects and promotes our values, our moral 
goodness, and whether it is the right thing to do. 
  Some of these questions may be more difficult to answer because they appeal to our 
values themselves, values that vary in a pluralistic society like the United States. Given the 
plurality of values, disagreement among scholars should not be surprising; some scholars 
argue that capital punishment is morally wrong (Bedau, 2004; Bright, 2004; Reiman, 
2004), while others argue that the death penalty is perfectly acceptable (Cassell, 2004; 
Pojman, 2004; van den Haag, 1997). Interestingly, such arguments often revolve around 
issues of freedom (libertarianism), equality (egalitarianism), and morality (virtue). For 
example, one person might say that capital punishment is unjust because it takes away a 
person‟s life and therefore all of his or her liberties and rights, including the right to life 
(Reiman, 2004). Another person might argue that murderers give up their rights by 
committing murders and that killing murderers actually increases respect for life by 
demonstrating to would-be murderers that “innocent” life is so sacred that it will be 
protected even by executing murderers (Pojman, 2004). An individual might argue that the 
death penalty is applied in a racially biased manner and is therefore not equal (Bright, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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2004). Another individual might argue that the racial distribution of death row or executions 
is irrelevant when you are talking about convicted murderers, all of whom deserve to die 
(Cassell, 2004). Where ever the truth lies, the point is that these are arguments about 
freedom, equality, and virtue. 
  Although some will see the death penalty as merely a “values issues,” there is also 
empirical evidence about death penalty practice that will help us answer whether the death 
penalty in the United States is consistent or inconsistent with the major theories of justice. 
We now turn to this evidence which establishes important empirical realities of American 
capital punishment.  
 
The Real Death Penalty 
  It is important to note that capital punishment does not exist in theory, only in 
practice. Thus, the review of evidence presented here does not pertain to any theoretical or 
philosophical argument either in favor or opposed to capital punishment. Instead, the 
evidence is relevant only to whether the death penalty, as it is actually practiced in our 
nation, is consistent or inconsistent with the theories of justice (as well as the values which 
underlie them). 
What is meant by the statement that “capital punishment does not exist in theory, 
only in practice” is this: people often argue about whether the death penalty is just or 
unjust based on theoretical or philosophical arguments, often without considering the facts 
of the death penalty. One example concerns the issue of retribution. A supporter of capital 
punishment might say, “I support the death penalty because of „an eye for an eye.‟” Or 
perhaps he or she might say because “the death penalty is the only way to achieve justice 
for murder victims.” These statements ignore the facts of the death penalty, as it is actually 
utilized in the United States—the most important of which is that only about 1% of 
murderers are ever executed. So a reasonable response to these claims might be, “If a 
state kills only 1% of murderers, do we achieve an „eye for an eye‟?” Or perhaps, “What Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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about the vast majority of murderers who do not get executed but who instead spend 
decades in prison for their crimes; is this not justice?”  
  Four basic facts establish the realities of American capital punishment. The first is 
that capital punishment is practiced in most but not all US jurisdictions. Specifically, there 
are 34 states with the death penalty, and 16 without (the state of Illinois abolished the 
death penalty in 2011). The federal government also maintains capital punishment, as does 
the military, but the District of Columbia does not carry out executions. However, of these 
death penalty jurisdictions, only nine regularly carry out an execution, meaning they have 
averaged at least one execution a year since 1976 when capital punishment was reinstated; 
thus only about one-quarter (26%) of death penalty states (nine of 34) and 18% of all 
states in the country (nine of 50) average one or more executions per year. Further, only 
one state has carried out at least ten executions per year since 1976—Texas (Robinson, 
2008). In fact, only about 10% of counties with the death penalty imposed a death 
sentence between the years 2004-2009 (Smith, 2010a).  
  As may already be obvious, executions are extremely rare in the United States, even 
though the number of executions per year regularly ranks America in the top five nations in 
the world (behind nations like China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan). This raises the 
second fact of capital punishment practice, which is, relative to murder, capital punishment 
is especially rare in the United States. For example, in the first thirty years after capital 
punishment was reinstated (1977-2006), there were 592,580 murders and nonnegligent 
manslaughters in the US, for an average of 19,752 killings per year. During this time, 7,225 
death sentences were handed down, for an average of 241 death sentences per year. And 
there were 1,099 executions, for an average of 37 executions per year. This means that 
about 1.2% of killings from 1977 to 2006 led to death sentences, and only about 0.185% of 
killings have led to an execution so far (Robinson, 2008), with another 3,261 death row 
inmates awaiting death at the end of 2009 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2010b). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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  The rare nature of capital punishment can be attributed to at least two reasons. 
First, the numbers above come from all jurisdictions, including those without the death 
penalty. Yet, even in death penalty states, death sentences and executions are quite rare 
relative to killings. For example, Texas—which leads the United States in the number of 
executions since 1976— had 51,729 murders between the years of 1976 and 2002, for an 
average of 1,915 killings per year. During these years, Texas handed down only 31 death 
sentences per year and carried out a meager 12 executions per year. Thus, even in Texas 
(which leads all states in the number of executions every year), only 1.6% of the killers 
from 1976 to 2002 were sentenced to death and even less (only 0.63%) of its murderers 
were executed. The state that leads the nation in its sentencing of convicted murderers 
(Nevada) sentences only about 6% of murderers to death, meaning even there 94% of 
killers do not get sentenced to death (Robinson, 2008). 
  Second, not all murderers are even eligible for capital punishment, as only 
aggravated murderers can be sentenced to death and executed (Bohm, 2003). Research 
shows that only a tiny fraction of death eligible murderers receive death sentences and are 
executed (Zimring, 2003). This owes itself to at least three simple facts: 1) prosecutors 
rarely seek the death penalty; 2) juries rarely impose death sentences even when they are 
sought; and 3) states cannot afford the high costs of capital punishment practice (Robinson, 
2009b). 
  The third reality of American capital punishment is that death penalty practice is 
geographically disparate. Since 1976, about 82% of all executions have taken place in the 
South, largely because of its higher murder rates and much larger population bases. Only 
12% of executions have occurred in the Midwest, followed by 6% in the West; and less than 
five executions have been carried out in the entire Northeast. Amazingly, Texas has carried 
out 37% of all executions since 1976, including 49% of all executions in 2006, 59% in 
2007, 49% in 2008, 46% in 2009, and 37% in 2010. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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  In fact, the policy of capital punishment is something that is pursued by prosecutors 
in just a handful of locales within the country. For example, county level data illustrate that, 
since 1976, only about 14% of counties in the entire country have handed down death 
sentences that have led to an execution (Smith, 2010b). Further, only five counties are 
responsible for a disproportionate share of all the executions carried out since 1976, and 
four of the five are in Texas (Harris County, Texas has carried out more executions than any 
entire state!).  
  These first three, interrelated facts call into serious question the ability of capital 
punishment to achieve its assumed goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. 
Incapacitation is understood as removing the ability of offenders to commit future crimes; 
incarceration is the typical form whereas execution is the ultimate form. Deterrence refers 
to creating fear in would-be offenders through punishment to prevent future crimes; capital 
punishment can only be aimed at preventing crime by would-be murderers (general 
deterrence) since it cannot create fear in murderers who have already been executed 
(specific deterrence). Retribution refers to righting or rebalancing the scales of justice 
through punishment in order to achieve justice for crime victims (i.e., the government); 
executions are often depicted as retribution for the crime of murder, as well as a source of 
closure for murder victims‟ families. 
  Criminologists and capital punishment scholars overwhelmingly indicate that the 
death penalty fails to achieve these goals, mostly because of the rarity of death sentences 
and executions (Radelet and Lacock, 2009; Robinson, 2008). Logically, if death sentences 
and executions were more common, capital punishment would be more likely to achieve 
these goals. Yet we also know that the more frequently the death penalty is used, the 
greater the costs associated with the policy, including not only additional financial costs but 
also a greater risk of convicting, sentencing to death, and executing the innocent (Liebman, 
Fagan, and West, 2004). This ultimately has great significance for the “justice” of capital 
punishment. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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  This raises the fourth major reality of capital punishment in the United States, and 
that is that serious problems have been identified with death penalty practice. The two most 
significant problems relate to extra-legal sources of bias revolving around race, class, and 
gender; and wrongful conviction and execution. 
  Starting with race, America‟s death penalty has always been plagued by serious 
racial biases (Kotch, 2010; Steiker and Steiker, 2010). Little evidence remains of the 
historic discrimination by race of defendant, although state-specific anecdotal evidence 
suggests blacks are still occasionally discriminated against, especially when accused of 
killing whites and when juries are overwhelmingly white (Paternoster and Brame, 2003; 
Pierce and Radelet, 2005; Unah and Boger, 2001). Consider these real-life cases identified 
in North Carolina, which led to the passage of only the second Racial Justice Act in the 
nation: 
  Kenneth Rouse, a black man sentenced to death in Randolph County by an all-white 
jury, was judged by one self-admitted racist juror who reportedly believes that 
“black men rape white women so they can brag to their friends.” This juror admitted 
in a sworn affidavit that “blacks do not care about living as much as whites do.” He 
referred to African Americans as “niggers” and stated that bigotry played a 
meaningful role in his decision to vote for death. He also admitted that he lied about 
his racist beliefs so that he could be on the jury. Rouse is still on death row. 
  Raymond Rowsey, a black man, was sentenced to death in Alamance County by a 
jury comprising only one African American. This juror did not want to vote for death 
and stated in an affidavit that she was intimidated by other jurors to vote for death; 
she speculates that her race is why she was not given more attention by other 
jurors. Rowsey was executed in 2004. 
  Robert Bacon, a black man sentenced to death in Onslow County by an all-white 
jury, was granted clemency shortly before his execution after a juror came forward Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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and claimed that the jury made derogatory racial comments during deliberations and 
that his death sentence was motivated by racism.   
As noted earlier, the Racial Justice Act allows people to challenge both capital prosecutions 
as well as death sentences if they can show racial bias in capital punishment practice. 
  In fact, most experts now point to a “race of victim” effect, whereby killers of whites 
are far more likely to be sentenced to death and executed than killers of other races (Petrie 
and Coverdill, 2010). For example, a comprehensive study of race and the death penalty in 
North Carolina showed that killers of whites were more than three times more likely to 
receive death sentences than killers of blacks (Unah and Boger, 2001). In the state, 80% of 
those people executed since 1976 killed white people; only about 40% of North Carolina 
homicide victims are white. Further, a study of capital punishment practice in the state from 
1999 to 2006 found that blacks who killed whites were 14 times more likely to be sentenced 
to death than whites who killed blacks. Also, there were six executions of blacks who killed 
whites during the time period, yet zero executions of whites who killed blacks (Howell, 
2008). The very latest studies at the time of this writing also show serious biases based on 
race of victim in the state of North Carolina (Baumgartner and Unah, 2010; Grosso, O‟Brien, 
and Baldus, 2010). 
  Studies from numerous other states also find the same race of victim effect 
(Robinson, 2011). They show that the group most likely to be sentenced to death and 
ultimately executed is black killers of whites (Keil and Vito, 2006; Paternoster and Brame, 
2008), although this effect is not found in every state (Scheb, Lyons, and Wagers, 2008) 
and may in some cases be partially explained by legal factors (Berk, Li, and Hickman, 
2005). In the United States since 1976, 15 whites who killed blacks have been executed 
versus 242 blacks who killed whites (Death Penalty Information Center, 2010d). Looking 
even farther back, a study of 15,978 executions since 1739 found only 30 cases in which a 
Caucasian was put to death for a crime against an African American (Radelet, 1989). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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  The racial biases in capital punishment practice are so serious that they lead to this 
conclusion from some of the leading scholars researching racial bias in criminal justice 
practice:  
We contend that the type of discrimination found in the capital sentencing process 
falls closer to the systematic end of the discrimination continuum … Racial 
discrimination in the capital sentencing process is not limited to the South, where 
historical evidence of racial bias would lead one to expect differential treatment; it is 
applicable to other regions of the country as well. It is not confined to one stage of 
the decision making process; it affects decisions made by prosecutors and juries. It 
also is not confined to the pre-Furman period, when statutes offered little or no 
guidance to judges and juries charged with deciding whether to impose the death 
penalty; it is found, too, under the more restrictive guided discretion statutes 
enacted since Furman. Moreover, this effect does not disappear when legally relevant 
predictors of sentence severity are taken into consideration (Walker, Spohn, and 
Delone, 2007, p. 332). 
 
  One significant source of racial disparities in capital punishment practice may be 
“innocent” in nature; i.e., unintended because it may stem from the fact that 98% of 
prosecutors in death penalty jurisdictions are white (Robinson, 2008). These prosecutors 
may simply better identify with white victims and may also feel more pressure to pursue 
death sentences when whites are murdered. Nevertheless, it seriously threatens justice 
when prosecutors consider race, gender, and other legal factors in their decisions to seek 
death sentences (Songer and Unah, 2007; Unah, 2010). 
Research also shows that capital juries often use race in deliberations both during 
trial as well as in the sentencing phase (Gonzalez-Perez, 2002; Lynch and Haney, 2000; 
Otto, Applegate, and Davis, 2007). The Capital Jury Project, which studied 1,198 jurors 
from 353 capital trials in 14 states, has identified significant problems with capital juries, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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including bias in jury selection (Bowers, 1995, 1996; Blume, Eisenberg, and Garvey, 2003; 
Bowers, Steiner, and Antonio, 2003; Sandys, 1998); premature decision making by jurors 
(Bowers, Sandys, and Steiner, 1998); failure to understand jury instructions (Bentele and 
Bowers, 2002; Bowers and Steiner, 1999; Eisenberg and Wells, 1993; Foglia, 2003; Garvey, 
Johnson, and Marcus, 2000; Luginbuhl and Howe, 1995); erroneous beliefs by jurors that 
death is required based on its heinous nature (Blume, Garvey, and Johnson, 2001; 
Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells, 1996; Garvey, 1998); underestimating the length of time 
murderers will serve in prison if not sentenced to death (Hoffman, 1995, 1997; Sarat, 1995; 
Steiner, Bowers, and Sarat, 1999); and a race of juror effect on capital sentencing, so that 
the odds of death sentences for black defendants with white victims are highest when there 
are white males on the jury (Bowers, Sandys, and Brewer, 2004; Bowers, Steiner, and 
Sandys,  2001; Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells, 2001; Foglia and Schenker, 2001). 
  Finally, the racial and ethnic make-up of both county and state populations has a 
direct and meaningful impact on capital punishment practice (Urbina, 2003). For example, 
states that have higher concentrations of Black citizens and conservative populations, as 
well as a higher percentage of Hispanics in the population, tend to have more people on 
death row and also carry out more executions (Pritchard and Wiatrowski, 2008). 
Additionally, counties with higher levels of white residents, especially when bordering 
counties with larger black populations, tend to produce more death sentences and 
executions (West et al., 2010). 
As for social class bias, there has been little systematic examination into this issue, 
but it is clear that the nation‟s death rows are filled with poor killers (i.e., wealthy killers 
rarely get sentenced to death). Some scholars point to a class effect created by a bias in the 
criminal law, whereby only some forms of killings are even eligible for the death penalty 
(Bohm, 2003; Reiman, 1998; Robinson, 2009a). Forms of killings committed by the wealthy 
(e.g., through defective products and dangerous working conditions) tend not to lead to 
death sentences, even when committed with culpability such as through negligence or Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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recklessness (Robinson and Murphy, 2008). Even within forms of killing classified as 
murder, experts overwhelmingly point to the issue of quality of defense representation and 
note that the poor are the least able to pay for competent defense, which increases the 
odds of death sentences (Bright, 1997, 2004; Dow, 2002; McAllister, 2003; Mello and 
Perkins, 2003). 
A survey of scholars who have published articles and books on capital punishment 
found they overwhelmingly believe capital punishment to be biased against the poor. 
Experts responded to this question with responses such as “There‟s a reason it‟s called 
capital punishment; those without the capital get the punishment” and “The criminal justice 
system knows who pays for it and in no place is it the poor” (Robinson, 2008). 
The impact of gender on capital punishment practice is not widely understood 
because it also has not been widely studied (Reza, 2005). Yet, we know that women are 
underrepresented among capital punishment populations. For example, although women 
make up about 10% of murderers, only about 2% of people on death row are women and 
only 1% of those executed have been women (Streib, 2004). This is due first to the fact 
that women are less likely to commit aggravated forms of murder, the type that of murder 
is eligible for death. Yet, it is also possibly due to a “chivalry effect,” whereby we are less 
likely to seek to kill women in the first place, and to sentence them to death in the second 
(Chesney-Lind and Pasko, 2004; Crew, 1991; Rodriguez, Curry, and Lee, 2006). 
Finally, some research now suggests that killers of women are more likely to be 
sentenced to death, especially killers of white women (Dieter, 1998; Holcomb, Williams, and 
Demuth, 2004; Phillips, Potter, and Coverdill, 2010). Although it may be too early to tell, 
early evidence suggests it is jurors who may be responsible for this reality rather than 
prosecutors (Williams, Demuth, and Holcomb, 2007). Additional research shows that cases 
involving white female victims and minority offenders are most likely to result in death 
sentences (Curry, 2010; Songer and Unah, 2007), although some of these disparities might 
be explained by other factors (Stauffer et al., 2006).  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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As for the issue of innocence, there is little doubt that people are wrongly convicted 
of murder every year and that a handful are even sentenced to death (Liebman, Fagan, and 
West, 2004; Radelet and Bedau, 2003; Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam, 1994). More than 130 
people have been freed from death row during the era of “super due process” that began in 
1976 when the US Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment. Wrongful convictions often 
occur due to honest errors such as mistaken eyewitness testimony and faulty forensic 
evidence, but when they occur due to issues such as “false confessions, lying informants, 
government misconduct, and ineffective defense counsel,” the justice implications for 
“justice” become pretty clear (Raderer, 2009, p. 14). Some characterize wrongful capital 
convictions as “state crimes” based on the hardships faced by the wrongly convicted 
(Westervelt and Cook, 2010). 
There is also little doubt that innocent people have even been executed, although 
most of the known cases are from prior to the era of super due process in capital sentencing 
(Harmon and Lofquist, 2005). There remain at least eight widely known cases where men 
have been recently executed despite serious doubts about their actual guilt (Death Penalty 
Information Center, 2010c). For example, Cameron Willingham was convicted of murder by 
arson of his three children in 1992 in the state of Texas and executed in 2004. 
Subsequently, four experts demonstrated significant flaws with the arson investigation of 
the case and showed that it is possible the fire was accidental. According to arson expert 
Gerald Hurst: “There‟s nothing to suggest to any reasonable arson investigator that this was 
an arson fire. It was just a fire.” And former fire instructor Kendall Ryland stated that: “It 
made me sick to think this guy was executed based on this investigation. … They executed 
this guy and they‟ve just got no idea—at least not scientifically—if he set the fire, or if the 
fire was even intentionally set.” Aside from the flawed fire investigation, the only other 
significant evidence in the case was a supposed confession to a jailhouse snitch named 
Johnny Webb; Webb was a drug addict on psychiatric medication. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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After learning of the problems with the case, former Juror Dorinda Brokofsky asked, 
“Did anybody know about this prior to his execution? Now I will have to live with this for the 
rest of my life. Maybe this man was innocent.” Ironically, another Texas death row inmate 
was exonerated only a year after Willingham was executed, based on nearly identical 
evidence that would have been used to free Willingham if a judge would have allowed for a 
review of the evidence prior to his execution (Mills and Possley, 2004). 
Another example of a person executed who might be innocent is Gary Graham, who 
was convicted and sentenced to death (and ultimately executed) based on the eyewitness 
testimony of one witness; the witness saw him from about 40 feet away and only looked at 
his face for a few seconds through the windshield of a car. His defense attorney was Ronald 
Mock, an attorney that “had so many clients sentenced to death that some refer to the 
„Mock Wing‟ of death row. Mock failed to seriously contest the state‟s case, conduct an 
independent investigation, and present witnesses at the scene who would have testified that 
Graham was not the person who committed the crime and that the perpetrator was much 
shorter than Graham” (Bright, 2004: 160). 
As people have become more aware of these realities of American capital 
punishment, death sentences are getting rarer and rarer, and so too are executions 
(Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun, 2008). Ironically, as capital punishment is practiced 
less, it is less likely to achieve its assumed goals of retribution, incapacitation, and 
deterrence, increasing the possibility that it is a failed policy that offers few benefits 
compared to its enormous costs. Not surprisingly, this has meaningful consequences for 
justice theory. 
Applying Theories of Justice to Capital Punishment Practice 
Given these important empirical realities of the death penalty, the next issue to 
address is which of them are relevant for the “justice” of capital punishment practice. As 
noted earlier, it depends on which theory of justice is being referred to. Recall that the most 
important question for libertarians is whether capital punishment respects liberty or Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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freedom. The most important question for egalitarians is whether capital punishment 
practice is equal (i.e., applied in an equal fashion). For utilitarians, the most important 
question is whether capital punishment increases overall utility or happiness in society. 
Finally, for virtue-based theorists, the question is whether capital punishment respects and 
promotes our values, our moral goodness, and whether it is the right thing to do. 
 
Liberty/Libertarianism 
  Supporters of capital punishment argue that executing murderers respects liberty by 
sending the clearest and strongest of messages about how important (innocent) life is to 
society; the most serious crime (murder) warrants the most serious consequence (death 
penalty). While this is logical, opponents point out that executions also end life and 
therefore greatly diminish liberty.  
The fundamental issue of importance here is about the rights of citizens and whether 
they apply to murderers. These rights include the right to life. As noted in the Declaration of 
Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (US History, 2010, emphasis added). Clearly, US 
law grants every citizen the right to life. Then there is the issue of rights of any human 
being. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights posits: “Everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of person” (United Nations, 2010, emphasis added). 
The issue over which capital punishment supporters and opponents disagree is 
whether the right to life espoused in US and international law should be maintained after a 
person commits a murder; death penalty supports maintain by taking a life, murderers 
should sacrifice their own life as a form of retribution; opponents disagree and argue these 
rights cannot be sacrificed, no matter what behaviors a person commits. 
Such philosophical arguments cannot be resolved with empirical evidence. Thus, we 
must simply examine whether capital punishment, as actually practiced in the United Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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States, helps achieve liberty or diminishes it. Empirically, it is easy to see that capital 
punishment is so rarely carried out in literally every death penalty jurisdiction (including 
those counties and states that still practice it), that capital punishment does not help 
achieve or assure liberty in society. Stated simply, if an execution were necessary to help 
protect the liberties of potential victims, states fail citizens 98-99% of the time (because 
only 1-2% of murderers are executed and sentenced to death, respectively). Let‟s say that 
one liberty Americans value is freedom from serious criminal victimization. If capital 
punishment were necessary to incapacitate and thereby permanently deprive murderers of 
their ability to commit future murders—which would thereby assure the liberty of citizens 
from serious criminal victimization (i.e., crime prevention)—murderers would have to be 
convicted, sentenced to death, and executed at a much higher rate than 1-2%. 
Finally, it is important to again acknowledge that innocent people are wrongly 
convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and even (apparently) occasionally executed. It is 
an affront to liberty when an innocent person loses his life for a crime he did not commit. 
The libertarian argument of capital punishment is thus that the death penalty is unjust. It is 
unjust because it does not help protect or assure liberty, and also because it occasionally is 
used against the innocent. 
Free market libertarians have not written about the death penalty. Yet, it is 
interesting to know that capital punishment is generally more expensive than other severe 
sanctions including even life in prison (Bohm, 2003; Cook, 2010; Robinson, 2008, 2009b, 
2011). As an example, in North Carolina, where the “most comprehensive death penalty 
study in the country” was conducted, the cost of a death penalty case all the way to 
execution above adjudication and a 20 year sentence was $163,000.  The extra cost per 
death penalty sentence was $216,000, and the total costs per execution were $2.16 million 
more than life imprisonment (Cook, Slawson, and Gries, 1993). Another study in found that 
North Carolina could save $11 million annually if it did not pursue capital punishment. This 
figure includes dollars spent on extra defense costs for capital cases in the trial phase, extra Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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payments to jurors, post-conviction costs, resentencing hearings, and costs of 
imprisonment, but does not include money spent on the Office of the Appellate Defender 
and the North Carolina Supreme Court, the extra time spent by prosecutors in capital cases, 
and the costs to taxpayers for federal appeals (Cook, 2009). And an additional study found 
North Carolina spends $20 million per year just on defense costs alone (North Carolina 
Office of Indigent Services, 2008). It would be interesting to see what free market 
libertarians might say about capital punishment if they ever took the time to weigh in on it. 
One relevant question would be is the capital punishment system a good use of 
resources given it is so rarely used. Studies now show, for example, that to maintain their 
capital punishment systems (whether used frequently or not), states have had to make cuts 
to spending on police, criminal defense, prison guards, highways, indigent care, libraries, 
higher education, health care, and state employee raises. They have also had to raise taxes 
(Death Penalty Information Center, 2010a). 
Equality/Egalitarianism 
  Clearly, there are significant racial disparities, class disparities, and gender 
disparities in capital punishment practice. Scholars nearly universally agree that these 
problems stem from systemic biases pertaining both to characteristics of defendants as well 
as victims. Thus, an undeniable conclusion of capital punishment practice is that the death 
penalty is applied in an unequal fashion. This should not be surprising given that there are 
also very disturbing extra-legal biases in virtually all of criminal justice practice, including 
imprisonment (which itself is a very unpleasant experience) (Barak, Leighton, and Flavin, 
2006; Feagin, 2001; Reiman, 2003; Robinson, 2009a; Walker, Spohn, and DeLone, 2007; 
Shelden, 2000). 
While it is undeniably true that much, if not all, of criminal justice is biased against 
certain groups in society—and it is quite possibly true that such biases will be difficult if not 
impossible to eradicate—it is also true that capital punishment has long been viewed as 
different than any other sanction, best captured in the phrase, “Death is different” (Acker, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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2009; Foster, 2004). According to Abramson (2004), capital punishment is “different in 
kind” from any other punishment, including even life imprisonment. At least two things 
make it different. The first is the “finality” of execution, making biased outcomes 
“irrevocable” and “irreversible.” The second is the “severity” or “enormity” of the 
punishment, making biased outcomes not only uncorrectable but also more perverse. 
The United States has a long history of treating some groups of people differently 
than others in terms of criminal punishments; one horrific example is the extra-legal 
punishment of lynching blacks for crimes (both real and imagined) mostly against whites 
(Bright, 2002; Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent, 2005; Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen, 
2005). Zimring (2003: 66) finds that the “states and the region where lynching was 
dominant show clear domination of recent executions, while those states with very low 
historic lynching records are much less likely than average to have either a death penalty or 
execution late in the twentieth century.” Zimring finds that the median number of 
executions in high lynching states is 24, versus zero in low lynching states. Zimring explains 
that: “The statistical contrast between these two groups of states shows that they occupy 
the same extreme positions on the distribution of two distinct varieties of lethal violence in 
the United States separated by almost a century and the formal participation of government 
authority in the killing” (p. 96). Capital punishment is now not only connected to this history 
but has become part of it. Thus, the egalitarian argument of capital punishment is that the 
death penalty is unjust. 
The final issue of inequality pertains to the evidence of geographic disparities 
associated with capital punishment practice. While each state has the right to pursue its 
own laws and policies under the concept of federalism, the resulting disparities are claimed 
to be unjust by some egalitarian justice scholars (e.g., Miller, 2003). Their argument is that, 
in a nation of laws that values equality, a person should not be treated differently based 
simply on where he or she lives. The counterargument is that place of residence will 
inevitably impact risk of capital processing due to different laws as well as the discretion of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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prosecutors to pursue whichever cases they see fit, using the threat of any punishment they 
choose to use (Davis, 2009). 
Utility/Utilitarianism 
Does the death penalty contribute to the overall happiness of society, to the general 
welfare of the people? One might think that if capital punishment could achieve desirable 
goals for society and that if the death penalty was actually used frequently enough to 
achieve these goals, it might contribute to societal welfare and citizen happiness. Yet, as 
noted earlier, capital punishment is so rarely carried out in literally every death penalty 
jurisdiction (including those counties and states that still practice it), that a safe conclusion 
is that capital punishment does not help achieve or assure happiness or welfare. 
This is not to say that the death penalty does not achieve any benefits to society. 
Clearly, executions do result in some incapacitation of offenders. That is, to whatever 
degree murderers do not commit murders that they would have committed but cannot 
because of their execution, this is a benefit to society. The relevant questions here are, to 
what degree are murderers likely to kill again?; and, is capital punishment necessary to stop 
such future killings? The answer to the first question is very unlikely, mostly because most 
people who commit murder do not reoffend. For example, a study of those inmates released 
as a result of the Furman decision found that they “lived a combined total of 1,282 years in 
the community while committing twelve violent offenses—approximately two violent 
offenses per year for the released inmates or nine violent offenses per 1,000 releases per 
year.” Further, of the 238 paroled offenders, “only a small percentage (less than 1%) of 
released murderers were returned to prison for committing a subsequent homicide. For 
example, of 11,532 murderers released between 1971 and 1975, twenty-six committed new 
homicides in the first year after release from prison ... after five years on parole, only one 
murderer committed a second murder while in the larger society ... Seven (1.3%) Furman-Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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commuted prisoners were responsible for seven additional murders” (Marquart and 
Sorensen, 1997: 171-174). 
Yet, a small number of murderers would kill again if not effectively incapacitated. 
Ironically, it is incapacitation though imprisonment that tends to stop these murderers from 
killing again. Thus, in answer to the second question, executions may be excessive because 
effective incapacitation can be achieved through life imprisonment. 
Executions may also produce a small general deterrent effect, thereby lowering the 
murder rate in society, although the vast majority of research on this topic suggests that 
capital punishment does not deter murder (Bailey, 1998; Berk, 2004; Cochran and Chamlin, 
2000; Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth, 1994; Donohue and Wolfers, 2005; Fagan, 2005; 
Goertzel, 2004; Kovandzic, Vieraitis, and Boots, 2009; Land, Teske, and Zheng, 2009; 
Peterson and Bailey, 1991; Sorensen et al., 1999; Stack, 1993; Thomson, 1997; Yunker, 
2001). 
If there is any deterrent effect, it is likely so small that it cannot even be measured 
(Robinson, 2008). This is, in fact, not even a controversial statement, since the following 
groups do not think the death penalty deters murder, according to the studies: scholars of 
capital punishment (Robinson, 2008); Presidents of the American Society of Criminology 
(ASC), the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS), and the Law and Society 
Association (LSA) (Radelet and Akers, 1996); ASC fellows, winners of the ASC Sutherland 
Award, and presidents of ASC between 1997 and 2009 (Radelet and Lacock, 2009); ASC‟s 
National Policy Committee (2001); everyday, ordinary citizens (Gallup, 2006) and law 
enforcement chiefs (Dieter, 1995). 
The relevant question here is not really whether capital punishment deters murder 
but whether it deters murder more than other available, severe sanctions (such as life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole). The available evidence suggests that 
executions produce no further deterrent effect (Robinson, 2008). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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Finally, executions undeniably provide some closure to murder victims‟ families 
(Lifton and Mitchell, 2000). Yet, it is also true that executions do not provide closure to 
many victims‟ families (Peterson, 2008), in part because of the delay between conviction, 
sentencing, and ultimate execution (average time span of 11 years). Vandiver (2003: 621) 
explains: 
The end of the trial and sentencing may mark an end to the involvement of the 
victim‟s family with the legal system. If the defendant is sentenced to life without 
parole or to a very long term of imprisonment, the sentence will begin immediately, 
and there should be no reason for the family to have to deal with the defendant 
again. If the defendant is sentenced to a short term of years, or will be eligible for 
parole after a short time, or above all, if he is sentenced to death, then the victims‟ 
family is likely to face a prolonged engagement with the criminal justice system. ... If 
the sentence is death, the family‟s involvement will continue beyond the trial for 
three or four years at a minimum, and may go on for as many as 20 or more years 
(p. 621). 
It is also true that some families do not seek or want the death penalty for killers of their 
loved ones and that family members of the condemned also suffer immensely, typically 
without the support of greater society (King, 2003, 2005; Vandiver, 1989). 
And once again, the relevant question is whether capital punishment leads to a 
greater sense of closure than that offered by other available, severe sanctions (such as life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole). Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer 
to this question; yet, executions are so rare that if closure requires an execution, we as a 
society fail to provide it to murder victims‟ families about 98-99% of the time. 
To determine the relative utility of capital punishment, one must of course assess 
these modest benefits against the costs of capital punishment. Assessing the contribution of 
capital punishment to the overall welfare of society is problematic for at least a few reasons. 
First, although one can readily identify the costs and benefits of policies like the death Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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penalty, quantifying some of them is quite difficult. How, for example, does one measure 
the worth of the closure that some victims‟ families may receive when the person who 
murdered their loved ones is executed? Second, weighing such benefits against costs 
associated with the practice of capital punishment such as biases based on extra-legal 
factors like race, class, and gender—not to mention easily quantifiable costs such as 
additional financial expense of capital punishment above and beyond other criminal 
sanctions such as life imprisonment—is difficult if not impossible. 
Third, as should be obvious by the term “weighing,” any weighing of costs and 
benefits involves much more than just counting them up and seeing whether there are more 
costs or more benefits; the weighing part requires that each benefit and each cost be 
prioritized more or less based on each person‟s own values. For example, one person may 
think the little bit of closure provided to victims‟ families by capital punishment and the 
possibly small crime reduction effect (through a tiny incapacitative effect and a possible 
general deterrent effect of executions) is worth more than extra-legal biases in the 
application of the punishment; this person would thus weigh the benefits more than the 
costs. Another person may find the risk of executing an innocent person, however small, to 
be such a serious costs that it outweighs any conceivable benefit of capital punishment. 
Such individualized opinions and preferences are affected by many factors, including  
race, gender, age, income level, political party and ideology, geography of residence, and 
religious beliefs (Young, 2002). Support for the death penalty is also partially determined by 
fear crime, views of how courts treat suspects, and racial animosity (Cochran and Chamlin, 
2006; Young, 2004).  
In spite of all this, it is a safe conclusion is that capital punishment, as actually 
practiced in the United States, has only modest benefits but enormous costs. Thus, the 
utilitarian argument of capital punishment is that the death penalty is unjust. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, I laid out the main theories of justice related to freedom, welfare, and 
virtue. I then outlined important realities of capital punishment in the United States. Finally, 
I showed how American capital punishment is mostly inconsistent with these theories of 
justice. When evaluating the death penalty against these theories of justice, we see that the 
death penalty fails to provide justice. This is because it does not respect liberty, it is not 
equally applied, and it imposes more costs than benefits and thus fails to increase overall 
utility or happiness in society. 
With regard to virtue-based theorists, recall that the most important question is 
whether capital punishment respects and promotes our values, our moral goodness, and 
whether it is the right thing to do. These are questions that are difficult to answer given the 
wide variety of values, morality, and sense of “right” among citizens. Yet, given that the 
death penalty fails to comport with libertarianism, egalitarianism, and utilitarianism, it would 
be hard to argue that capital punishment satisfies any virtue-based theory. That is, it would 
be hard to convincingly argue that capital punishment is valuable or moral or right when it 
fails to respect liberty, when it so unequally applied, and when it imposes more costs than 
benefits and thus fails to increase overall utility or happiness in society. 
Given that citizens actually hold values consistent with the theories of justice laid out 
in this paper—especially libertarianism and egalitarianism—it logically follows that they 
would not agree to capital punishment practice if they were aware of its realities. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis of US Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, who 
suggested that support for capital punishment among citizens would decline if Americans 
were aware of the facts of its application (Kennedy-Kollaw and Mandery, 2010). Marshall 
wrote, “the question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial proportion of 
American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, 
but whether they would find it so in the light of all information presently available.” Marshall Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology       Assessing the death penalty  
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put forth his view of the reality of capital punishment and suggested that people would not 
support it if they knew this reality. He concluded by writing: 
I believe the following facts would serve to convince even the most hesitant of 
citizens to condemn death as a sanction: capital punishment is imposed 
discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of people; there is evidence that 
innocent people have been executed before their innocence can be proved; and the 
death penalty wreaks havoc with our entire criminal justice system (pp. 263-264). 
 
There are actually three related Marshall hypotheses including: 1) support for capital 
punishment is inversely related to knowledge about it; 2) exposure to information about 
capital punishment generally leads to increased opposition to it; and 3) exposure to 
information about capital punishment does not reduce support among those who based their 
support mostly on matters of retribution. More than twenty published studies now find 
consistent but qualified support for these hypotheses (Cochran, Sanders, and Chamlin, 
2006). 
Research has clearly demonstrated significant problems with capital punishment 
practice in the United States, problems including but not limited to innocence and biases 
based on extra-legal factors such as race, class, and gender. While Americans may become 
less supportive of capital punishment as these facts are demonstrated through media 
accounts of the research, a significant part of the argument ought to relate to justice; 
specifically the theories of justice addressed in this paper. 
Finally, to the degree that support for capital punishment persists for reasons related 
to retribution, citizens could be made aware of the utilitarian argument that shows that the 
death penalty is simply too rarely practiced to achieve any meaningful level of retribution in 
society whereas alternatives such as life imprisonment are also available and much more 
effective. 
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